Often network components work correctly, yet end-to-end services don't. This can happen when configuration parameters of components are set to incorrect values. Configuration is a fundamental operation for logically integrating components to set up end-to-end services.
Introduction
Traditional network management systems diagnose hard, localized errors such as fiber cuts or hardware/software component failures. It is quite possible, however, that network components work correctly yet end-to-end services don't. This happens if there are configuration errors, i.e., configuration parameters of components are set to incorrect values. Configuration is a fundamental operation for integrating components to implement end-to-end services. Configuration errors arise frequently because transforming end-toend service requirements into configurations is inherently difficult: in realistic networks there are many components, configuration parameters, values, protocols and requirements. Yet, such transformation is largely performed manually. The resulting high cost of network operations as well as the potential for security breaches is well documented [1, 2] .
The Service Grammar [3, 4, 5, 6] technique has been developed to solve the configuration error diagnosis problem, and more generally, to formalize the process of building complex systems via configuration. At its core is a Requirements Language that contains global, high-level abstractions that are set up in the process of setting up end-to-end services. A good heuristic for deriving this language is to ask the question ''what does it mean for a group of agents executing a protocol to be correctly configured.'' This language is created for all of the protocols in a domain of interest. End-toend service requirements can be naturally defined as logical conjunctions of requirements in the language at and across different protocol layers. This is done by rules of the form A:-B 1 , . . . , B k , k ≥ 0, where each A and B i is a requirement. A Diagnosis Engine checks if a language requirement is true given definite system configuration. By recursive use of this operation, complex algorithms for diagnosis can be developed. Service Grammar captures the intuition to regard a system not as a set of components but as a set of services that, in general, span multiple components.
The information flow of the diagnosis system is illustrated in Figure 1 . The diagnosis engine takes input from two sources: (1) service requirements expressed in the requirements language, and (2) vendor-neutral component configurations stored at a centralized database, e.g., an LDAP directory. Raw component configuration is parsed into vendor-independent data structures by vendor-specific adaptors. The diagnosis engine queries the component configuration database and verifies if the configurations are consistent with service requirements. If not, it notifies the administrator where the diagnosis process had Service Grammars have been built and used for adaptive Virtual Private Networks and mobile security [3, 4, 5, 6] . This paper describes an application of Service Grammar to diagnosing configuration errors in BGP [7] . Previous solutions to diagnosing configuration errors have been network invariant [8] in that they contain a fixed set of constraints that must be satisfied by every BGP network. However, BGP requirements such as logical architecture and policies differ widely from one network to another. It is not possible in previous techniques to check if component configurations implement the intended requirements. Our tools enable administrators to specify network-specific requirements and check if they are correctly implemented by component configurations.
BGP Background
BGP is the Internet's inter-domain routing protocol run between autonomous systems (ASes). Routers in different ASes use BGP to exchange information on how to reach destinations throughout the Internet. BGP is path-vector based. A BGP route consists of a network prefix N and an AS_PATH of the form {AS k , . . . , AS 0 }, which is the ordered list of ASes to traverse to reach N. The AS path is constructed by successively propagating reachability information: each AS prepending its own AS number to the path (one or more times) before sending it to neighbors. Figure 2 illustrates how routing information about network 200.12.0.0/16 is propagated between ASes. For instance, AS160 knows its traffic will traverse AS172, AS180 and AS200 before reaching the destination.
BGP is capable of enforcing policies based on various preferences and constraints. BGP policies affect the route selection and export process, thereby controlling how traffic enters and leaves an AS. Each AS can define BGP policies according to its own criteria. BGP chooses the best route based on a number of metrics, such as the AS path length. In Figure Policy can be also applied to the route propagation process. An AS decides what to tell its neighbors. If an AS is unwilling to carry certain traffic for a neighbor, its policy will disallow routing advertisements about particular destinations being sent to the neighbor. For instance, AS180 and AS190 chose not to export routes to N to each other. As a result, the horizontal link between the two ASes will not be used to carry traffic to N. In a less restrictive case, AS200 tells AS190 about N, but prepends its AS number twice to make the path longer, indicating the route is considered a less attractive one. The policy eventually affects AS172's route selection process: it chose AS180 instead of AS190 as the next hop AS to reach N.
Challenges of Setting Up BGP
To set up BGP, network administrators configure individual routers in the AS using a configuration language. The following is a sample configuration in Cisco CLI format [9] for a router in AS160. The configuration involves originating routes, establishing peer relationship with neighbors, and applying policy filters. In this example, the router announces network 172.1.1.0/24 and peers with a remote BGP router in AS172. The policy filter allows only routes with an empty AS path (i.e., locally originated routers) to be advertised to AS172: As BGP is a complex protocol, manually configuring individual routers is a time-consuming and error prone task. This is especially challenging in a large network with hundreds to thousands of routers. To maintain
BGP Requirements Language Requirement
Meaning ibgp_session (RouterA, RouterB, LocalAS)
Both RouterA and RouterB are BGP speakers of the local AS. A BGP session can be successfully established between them. ebgp_session (LocalRouter, LocalAS, RemoteRouter,
RemoteAS)
A BGP session can be successfully established between the local BGP speaker and the remote BGP speaker.
reflector_client_session (ReflectorRouter, ClientRouter, LocalAS)
In addition to ibgp_session requirements, the reflector is set up to forward routing updates from other IBGP peers to the client. cluster (Reflectors, Clients, LocalAS)
Reflectors and clients form a cluster, i.e., reflectors are fully meshed and all clients are peered with all reflectors. as_full_mesh (Clusters, Non-clients, LocalAS)
Clusters and non-clients form an AS, i.e., all reflectors and non-clients are fully-meshed. No client peers with a non-client. route_originate (Subnets, LocalAS)
The LocalAS originates routes represented by subnets.
link_to_provider (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter)
The session represents a link to the local AS's provider. On this session, the local AS should accept everything, but only announce its own routes. link_to_customer (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter)
The session represents a link to the local AS's customer. On this session, the local AS should announce everything, but only accept the customer's routes. link_to_peer (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter)
The session represents a link to the local AS's peer. On this session, the local AS should only announce its customers' routes, and only accept the peer's customers' routes.
provider_as (LocalAS, RemoteAS)
RemoteAS is a provider of LocalAS.
customer_as (LocalAS, RemoteAS)
RemoteAS is a customer of LocalAS.
peer_as (LocalAS, RemoteAS)
RemoteAS is a peer of LocalAS.
preferred_outgoing_link (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter, RemoteDestination)
The session is the preferred outgoing link to reach a remote destination, expressed in either subsets or ASPath.
preferred_incoming_link (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter, LocalDestination)
The session is the preferred incoming link to reach a local destination, expressed in either subsets or ASPath.
preferred_neighbor_entry (LocalRouter, RemoteRouter, LocalDestination)
The session is the preferred entry from the neighbor AS to reach a local destination, expressed in either subsets or ASPath.
Ta b l e 1:
Service grammar for BGP. a consistent view of routing inside an AS, all BGP routers must be correctly configured to form a full-mesh or some well-structured internal hierarchy, such as route reflector clusters. At a lower-level, two BGP speakers must be able to talk to each other in order to exchange routing information. This seemingly obvious requirement has certain intricacies due to the fact that BGP relies on pre-existing connectivity provided by Interior Gateway Protocols (IGP) or static routes. For example, the remote peer address specified by a BGP router must match the outgoing interface of the IGP route used by the remote peer. Otherwise the connection will not be established, unless the remote peer explicitly specifies the matching interface. This type of implicit requirement can be easily overlooked by administrators, or violated due to change of the network.
Policy routing is an important functionality of BGP, but also provides numerous opportunities for configuration errors. In face of this type of errors, BGP may continue to operate, but does not enforce the intended policy. Policy violation could lead to connectivity, security and economic problems. A well-know problem is address space hijacking, in which one AS accidentally announces networks ''owned'' by other ASes, forming a '' b l a c k h o l e '' within the Internet. Other policy problems are commonly related to the commercial relationships an AS participates in. A multi-homed AS, for instance, shouldn't provide transit service to non-local traffic. The causes of errors are diverse, ranging from typos to poor understanding of configuration semantics. An excellent empirical study of BGP policy configuration errors is presented in Reference [10] .
Service Grammar for BGP
Correct BGP configuration means all routers in an AS achieve the joint goal of exchange routing information, maintaining a consistent view of routing and enforcing intended policies. However, there is quite a large conceptual gap between this global requirement and individual router configurations. Configuration errors arise because manual compilation of these high-level requirements into low-level ''machine language'' is difficult. If for some reason the global requirements are not satisfied there are no systematic tools to automatically diagnose configuration errors. Network administrators today manually perform these tasks.
Diagnosing why routers don't work together requires global reasoning about the logical structure of the network as well as dependencies between services. The BGP Service Grammar captures these global abstractions that are set up in the process of constructing routing services. By making these definitions explicit, network administrators can formally state high-level network-specific requirements and policies using these definitions.
A subset of the requirement language is shown in Ta b l e 1 followed by detailed explanations. The requirements fall into two categories: connectivity and policy.
Connectivity Requirements
The language provides two basic primitives -ibgp_session and ebgp_session -for describing BGP neighbor relationships. We outline the diagnosis procedure for ibgp_session in Figure 3 .
Regarding establishing BGP neighbor relationship, the types of configuration errors that can arise include:
• Incorrect AS number or neighbor address at two session end points, peer values are not mirror images of each other (usually typos).
• The neighbor's address is not reachable via IGP. This can happen when a loop-back interface is used but that interface does not participate in any IGP.
• A router tries to connect to a reachable interface of a remote neighbor, but the neighbor uses a different outgoing interface in the reverse IGP route. This happens when the neighbor has multiple reachable interfaces. Any of the above errors can lead to connectivity problems preventing the BGP session from being established. This example demonstrates that even a very basic BGP requirement implies a number of assumptions and global relationships that the administrator must keep in mind and configure correctly on every router. There are many places for errors. The diagnosis engine systematically validates these assumptions and global relationships, catching all potential errors and providing useful information for the debugging process. Notice these basic primitives are already higherlevel than raw router configurations. They can be used to compose other higher-level requirements that specify an AS' logical structure, such as reflector_client_session and cluster. Figure 4 illustrates how to validate if a group of routers form a cluster. The algorithm verifies three global properties: all reflectors are fully meshed, all clients can receive updates from all reflectors, and every client only has BGP sessions with routers in the same cluster. IBGP session test is embedded as part of the procedure.
Policy Requirements
Routing policies are configured via policy filters. A filter consists of a match criteria and a set of actions. Nearly all attributes of a routing update can be used to specify the match criteria, with AS path and network prefix being the most common ones. When a routing update satisfies the conditions set in the match criteria, associated actions (permit, deny, or modify) are invoked to control the propagation of the update. A filter can be applied to route origination, import and export process. It serves as the low-level building block for composing arbitrary routing policies. Our BGP Service Grammar supports the direct use of low-level filters to specify policy requirements. What we highlight in this section is the grammar that describes global AS-level properties, rather than that of an individual filter. These abstractions give network administrators a set of templates for defining common AS routing policies at high-level. Lowlevel filters can then be used for further refinement. We believe such a design would largely reduce the need for administrators to go into the low-level configuration details of each filter. Ty p i c a l commercial relationships between two neighboring ASes can be characterized as customer, provider, or peer, as defined in [11] . To test if a remote AS is a customer (provider, or peer) of the local AS, we need to verify that the relationship holds on all sessions between the two ASes. Figure 5 outlines the diagnosis procedure for link_to_provider. When exporting routers to a provider, an AS exports its own and its customer routers, but usually does not export routes learned from providers or peers. A properly configured export filter on this session should block those routes. For each provider and peer AS, the diagnosis procedure constructs an AS path containing the AS number, and feeds it to the export filter. Any of these paths passing the filter is a violation of the policy. In that case, the diagnosis procedure fails. This procedure uses several utilities functions. Get_Provider_AS returns the set of ASes that are marked as a provider of the local AS. Routemap_Eval mimic the processing of a policy filter on a route update.
When multiple routes to a remote destination (network or AS) exist, one link is usually designated as the primary route and others serve as backup. Such a policy can be expressed with preferred_outgoing_link. Its diagnosis procedure ( Figure 6 ) examines the import filter on all EBGP sessions. For each session, the procedure calculates the local-preference that a route update to the remote destination would get if it arrives on this session. To pass the test, the import filter on the preferred session must be the one that generates the highest local-preference. Both preferred_incoming_link and preferred_neigh-bor_entry are used to control incoming traffic by designating a primary route to a local destination. The difference is that the latter only concerns two neighboring ASes. The diagnosis procedures are similar. Both procedures examine export filters, except that the former looks for the filter that generates the shortest AS path, while the latter looks for the one that generates the lowest multi-exit-discriminator (med).
Sample Network Study
We have designed an experimental BGP network consisting of nine CISCO routers in five ASes, shown in Figure 7 . The goal is to demonstrate different BGP architecture, peering relationship and routing policies.
Under this setup: To realize these policies, network administrators first need to analyze the underlying requirements that support them. Typically, Policy 1 requires the two networks be originated by the two BGP speakers. Policy 2 requires outbound filters on every EBGP session that only allows locally originated routes to be advertised. Policy 3 and 4 require inbound filters to set up the local-preference attribute correctly. More precisely, routes to AS172 learned from AS190 should be given a higher local-preference, as should routes to AS180 learned via BGP1. should do the opposite. BGP3 then is able to decide which router is the best to reach these networks based on the metric. The med value should be set by outbound filters of BGP1 and BGP2.
For Policy 7, a common practice is for AS200 to prepend its own AS number to all updates sending to AS190. This would discourage incoming traffic from going through AS190 because everything else being equal BGP will select the route with the shortest AS Path.
Based on these requirements, administrators then choose the appropriate configuration commands and parameter values for each router to satisfy them. Figure 8 and Figure 9 give a snapshot of the working configuration of BGP1 and BGP2.
The configuration errors that can arise include (in fact, we inadvertently made most of them in setting up our network):
1. Forget to configure the static route to the loopback interface of BGP1 and BGP2. Neighbor address becomes unreachable. BGP session could not be established. 2. Forget to specify the update-source in the neighbor command. TCP connection is rejected and BGP session could not be established.
3. Forget the AS path access list. AS200 becomes a transit AS of AS180 and AS190. 4. Incorrect route maps and filters due to misunderstanding of the syntax of regular expression and meaning of path attributes. For example, a lower med value is considered better, which is in contrast to a higher local-preference is favored in the route selection process. 5. For Policies 5 and 6, BGP1 and BGP2 should give, respectively, more and less favorable values to med. It is entirely possible that both give equally favorable values. 6. For Policy 7, AS200 should prepend its own AS number in all updates to AS190, and this rule should be enforced both at BGP1 and BGP2. If it is forgotten at one router, Policy 7 will not be implemented. This example shows that manual compilation of high-level requirements into low-level configuration is a rather demanding and error-prone process. Even for a small network, the resulting configuration is already complex. It is not so obvious how each individual commands relate to intended policies. A large network has many more routers to manage and much more complicated policies in place. The service requirement also changes more frequently. It will be even harder for the administrator to keep the mental map of how each policy is effected on each individual routers, and make sure adding or modifying devices and services does not violate existing requirements.
bgpAS200 :-AS200basicConnectivity, AS200policies. AS200basicConnectivity :-ibgp_session(BGP1, BGP2, AS200), ebgp_session(BGP1, AS200, BGP3, AS180), ebgp_session(BGP2, AS200, BGP3, AS180), ebgp_session(BGP2, AS200, BGP4, AS190), as_full_mesh({}, {BGP1, BGP2}, AS200 preferred_incoming_link(BGP1, BGP3, ALL), preferred_incoming_link(BGP2, BGP3, ALL). preferred_incoming_link(BGP2, BGP3, ALL), preferred_incoming_link(BGP2, BGP3, ALL). Table 2 : AS200 service grammar.
Using Service Grammar, the global requirements of AS200 can be described as shown in Table 2 .
The description is concise and hides most lowlevel details. More importantly, it highlights the constraints spanning multiple routers that have to be enforced. Keeping track of such global constraints in low-level configuration language would be much harder. The diagnosis engine can effectively identify the configuration errors listed above. For instance, the first two errors will result in ibgp_session_test to fail. Missing AS path access list can be detected by link_to_provider. Similarly, misconfigured route-maps are caught by policy grammar rules.
Related Work
Our system provides a language to express the logical structure of an AS and its BGP policies. It and can automatically check expressions in this language against router configurations and thereby provide a useful diagnosis service, which has not been available to date. The main difference between this approach and previous diagnosis systems is that we can describe the BGP architecture of an AS in a high level language and check that it has been correctly configured. If someone changes a router configuration, he can just run the diagnosis again to ensure that the logical structure and policies have not been violated. In Netsys [8] , there is no way to describe the administrator's intention, i.e., network-specific policies and structure. It just runs a collection of network-invariant tests.
Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) [12] allows a network operator to specify routing policies in a high-level language. Given sufficient details, low-level router configurations can be generated from the description. RPSL shares some common views with our approach. We feel Service Grammar is better suited for diagnosing configuration errors because of its expressive power. In the short run, we believe diagnosis is even more important than provisioning because it gives administrators the desirable level of control and predictability, and can be used immediately.
It is natural to extend our system for provisioning. Given a comprehensive service specification, it can be compiled into vendor-neutral component configurations. Vendor-specific adaptors can then be applied to generate low-level router configuration commands. Reference [4] demonstrates a system that implements Service Grammar rules in Prolog. Because of the relational nature of Prolog, service specification simultaneously serves provisioning purposes. Another system that performs a set of specialized provisioning tasks is described in [13] .
Reference [14] studies IBGP routing anomalies and proposes sufficient conditions that guarantee correctness. These conditions can be incorporated into our Service Grammar as policy templates. Reference [10] presents an empirical study of BGP misconfigurations. Several classes of errors, such as reliance on upstream filtering, forgotten filter, incorrect summary, bad route map, etc., are caused by simple high-level policies that are not obvious for operators to express at the CLI level. Our system would reduce these types of errors given the high-level, system-wide requirements.
Summary
Our Service Grammar system enables a new way of configuration error diagnosis in a distributed environment. Network administrators can express the global requirements in a high-level language. The diagnosis engine then systematically verifies if the expressions in this language are satisfied by device configurations in a top-down fashion. Our system highlights global reasoning -i.e., why a group of components fail to jointly compose the intended service -rather than why a single component fails.
We demonstrate how to use such a system to diagnose BGP configuration errors in an AS. Previous solutions to diagnosing configuration errors have been network invariant in that they contain a fixed set of constraints that must be satisfied by every BGP network. However, BGP requirements such as logical architecture and policies differ widely from one network to another. It is not possible in previous techniques to check if component configurations implement the network-specific requirements. Our language consists of a small set of abstractions that can be composed to describe most BGP features.
One limitation of this approach is that Service Grammars and diagnosis procedures must be developed for each protocol of interest. We have prototyped Service Grammars for RIP, OSPF, BGP, BGP/MPLS, PIM, GRE, IPSEC, DiffServ and the Spread group communication protocol [15] . The difference between grammars tends to be significant because they are very protocol-specific. Based on our experience, the amount of effort required to develop the Service Grammar for a protocol is not terribly large. The notion of correct configuration is already implicit in the definition of protocols since their intended use is a part of the definition. The job of the Service Grammar designer is essentially to make this ''configuration logic'' explicit by analyzing these definitions.
The challenge for end users is that they need to go through another learning curve, and may still write incorrect specifications in this language. However, we believe the chances of errors should be lowered in this high-level language as oppose to low-level configuration commands.
